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Ardell W. Nease
John J. Gutsmiedl
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Rockwell International
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Abstract
Now is the time to revisit the use of the Space
Shuttle to implement the DoD policy of dual
access to space. The Shuttle Program is in
transition,
improving
its
operational
responsiveness and reducing its costs to
satisfy customer requirements. Many key
Shuule Program management positions are
held by people with DoD spacelift
experience. NASA's way of doing business is
. being changed to make programs happen
quicker, faster, and cheaper. Shuttle cosrs
have been reduced by more than 25 percem
since 1991. Funher consolidation and
streamlining of Shuttle operations can be
implemented to reduce recurring costs to as
low as $2.0 billion, down over $1.5 billion
from today's operations costs. Shuule
processing has been improved to the point
that the current four Orbiter fleet could easily
support twelve flights per year, up four over
today's flight manifest. The Shuttle provides
the DoD with a backup launch capability for
larger payloads which is much more reliable
and less costly than the Titan IV. In addition,
the Space Shuule provides the DoD with
many unique spacelift capabilities nOl
available from the expendable launch vehicle
fleet. The decision prior to the Challenger
accident to move the preponderance of the
payloads to Shuttle was just as incorrect as
the decision after the Challenger accident to
remove all DoD and commercial payloads
from Shuttle. This paper will present how the
Space Shuttle can become DoD's cost
effective solution to dual access to space and

the benefits the DoD will accrue from
.utilizing the Shuttle as a spacelift asset.
Background
The DoD has played a major role in the
development of the Space Shuttle. Many
program requirements were DoD derived
such as polar orbit, 1100 NM cross range
capability for polar orbit return, and a payload
bay 60 feet in length and 15 feet in diameter.
Early Shuttle manifests averaged two DoD
flights per year from the Eastern Test Range
(ETR). A launch site was developed at the
Western Test Range (WTR) co suppon polar
launches. Shuttle Orbiter OV·103 was
designated as the Vandenberg Orbiter.
However, space policy decisions led DoD to
remove operational payloads from the Shuttle.
The Shuttle was perceived as being expensive
and comple11:. NASA controlled the launch
process, established launch priority, and
reserved final approval of crew selection. The
payload manifesting cycle and integration
processes were perceived as too long and
complicated. The Challenger accident, and the
resultant stand down demonsrrated the need for
dual access to space. The subsequent
prohibition of Centaur upper stages on the
Shuttle limited the number of DoD missions
that could be flown on the Shuttle. The
decision to not activate the SLC·6 complex at
the WTR reduced the Shuttle's ability to satisfy
DoD payload mission requirements. But even
with these limiiations, the Shuttle has proven
its ability to support DoD and national
payloads.

...

The Case For Shutlle
With the recent Titan IV and Atlas launch
vehicle problems, and the maturing of the
Shuttle system, it seems appropriate to
readdress the issues that precipitated the
departure of the DoD from the Shuttle.
Additionally, with the severe budget
constraints being placed on DoD programs, a
"use what's available" philosophy provides a
cost-effective alternative to a "dedicated
system" approach. Just as Dcscn Storm
demonstrated that commercial airlines and
commercial GPS receivers could effectively
augment dedicated DoD assets, a routinely
flying Shuttle could augment DoD launch
assets. With the activation of the Space
Warfare Center and its focus on space
applications, the Shuttle offers what no ELY
can match - a space-based tactics and test lab
with man-in-the-loop.
The Shuttle program is in transition,
improving the operational responsiveness and
reducing costs
to satisfy the needs of
customers. Organizational changes at each
related NASA center and Headquarters are
being made. Many key Shuttle program
positions are filled by people with DoD
space-lift experience. The way of doing
business is being changed to make things
happen quicker, faster and cheaper.
The Space Shuttle system provides unique
capabilities as the nation's premier heavy-lift
launch system. Of primary benefit are its
capability to deliver up to 58 klb to low earth
orbit, its ability to act as an orbital test bed for
a wide variety of experiments and missions,
and its capability to operate at inclinations
from 28 to 63 degrees. The Shuttle can stay
on orbit for up to 16 days (28 days with the
Long Duration Orbiter upgrade kit) and it can
be configured with several variations of
labora!ories for specified missions. The
Hubble repair mission validated the Shuttle's
capability to perform on-orbit checkout,
maintenance and repair of high-value
payloads. Potential Shuttle upgrades that will

enhance operations and improve mission
capability include controls and displays
upgrades, GPS navigation, electro-mechanical
actuators, rugged thermal protection systems,
standard payload interface and vehicle health
management. Figure 1 shows many of the
potential performance upgrades under
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Figure
I.
Improvements

Potential

Performance

consideration to improve the Shuttle payload
capability by 15,500 pounds to deploy and
service the Global Space Station at an
inclination of 51.6 degrees. The Shuttle can
deliver a valuable payload to orbit, check it
out, make any necessary repairs and deploy
the payload. Retrieved payloads can be placed
into the payload bay for return to eanh.
The Space Shuttle has the highest launch
vehicle success rate when compared to today's
operational expendable launch vehicles
(Table I). The Saturn launch vehicle which
used the same design approach as the Space
Shuttle had a 100 percent launch success rate.
Eleven of the 57 successful launches have
been dedicated DoD missions, the latest being
STS-53, which flew in December 1992.
Numerous secondary payloads have flown in
the payload bay, in the aft flight deck and as
hand-held experiments operated by military·
trained astronauts. Shuttle DoD experiments
earth-surface
object
have
included
identification, space object tracking and
various communications tests.
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LAUNCH
VEHICLE

%

Shuttle

98.3

Delta

94.6

Ariane

91.8

Titan 34B, 11, 111
Proton

91.1
88.3

Scout

87.9

Titan IV

85.7

Long March

83.3

Atlas

80.2

Table I. Shuttle Has Highest Launch Success
Rate
The Shuttle has a better on-time launch record
than the expendable launch vehicles (Figure
2). An attempt was made to apply the same

and founeen others in two attempts. Twcntyseven of the Shunle launch delays to later in
the same day or scrubs to another day were
cause.d by weather. Some of the weather
violations were at the world-wide abort sites
necessary for the safe return of the crew. It is
inappropriate to consider those weather
related delays or scrubs when comparing
Shuttle to ELY launch-on-time performance.
Safe return of the crew and payload is a small
price to pay for occasional delays or scrubs.
Additionally, each Shuttle flight element
contractor has reassessed and refined launch
constraint redlines to improve launch
probability. Furthermore, the program has
minimized violations of winds aloft criteria
by recently implementing a day-of-launch lload update (DOLILU) capability which
further improves launch probability. The
implementation of these improvemencs has
led to an overall launch probability
consistently in excess of 90%.
The Space Shuttle provides competitive cargo
cost into orbit. As indicated in Figure 3, the
Shuttle cost ($/lb.) to LEO is less than Titan
IV and competitive with Atlas and Ariane.

Figure 2. Shuttle Has Better On-Time Launch
Record Than ELVs

definition for "launch delay"- any delay after
the launch vehicle has arrived at the launch
pad that prevents the launch from occurring
on the scheduled day-to both ELYs and the
Shuttle. Since the ELV data did not always
specify when the launch date was established,

all delays may not have been considered. Of
the fifty-seven Shuttle flights from STS-1
through STS-51, thirty-five have been
successfully launched in one launch attempt
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Figure 3. Shuttle Provides Competitive Cargo
Cost Into Orbit
While accurate and comparable costs are
difficult to determine, there is no conflict over
cost trends. Shuttle costs have been coming
down while Titan IV costs have increased.
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The cost ranges reflect expected variations in
flight rates per year of the Shuttle and
variations in production runs and payload
integration complexity for the ELVs. Lower
flight rates result in higher cost/lb. to LEO
because fixed costs are spread over fewer
flights. Conversely, higher flight rates result
in lower cost/lb. The fixed costs dominate at
low launch rates (Figure 4). As the flight rate
increases from 8 per year to 12 per year, the
recurring costs increase only by $407M
($3,359M for 8 flights to $3,766M for 12
flights). At the same time, the average cost
per flight decreases from $420M (for 8
flights) to $314M (for 12 flights) and the cost
per pound decreases from $6,667M (for 8
flights) to $4,984 (for 12 flights).
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Figure 4. Fixed Infrastructure Drives Total
Recurring Costs
Additional cost reductions can be achieved to
make the Shuttle system even more cost
effective. The Shuttle launch operations
concept should be mod.ified to initiate a long
range operations cost reduction plan leading
to an industrial STS operator (Figure 5): The
first step is the consolidation of NASA
contractor roles and the elimination of
duplicate effort across all Shuttle operations
contracts. The elimination of duplicate launch
support services
significantly reduces
manpower and provides a direct link from
Shuttle element processor to Shuttle element
designer. It eliminates at least one layer of
oversight and removes the inefficiency that
goes with multiple contractor interfaces and
the hand off of technical issues. Additional

Figure 5. Shuttle Operations Cost Can Be
Reduced To At Least $2.0B
consolidation of support contracts and
elimination of duplicate effort will lead to
significant Shuttle operations cost reductions
and still maintain hardware reliability and
safety.
NASA must manage program milestones and
the contractors on a mission contract basis.
Shuttle management responsibilities should
incrementally transition to an industrial
Shuttle Operator with NASA retaining top
level control and with a single contractor held
accountable
for
Shuttle
operation.
Redundancies between the civil servants,
element contractors, processing contractors,
arid support services contractors could be
significantly reduced, if not eliminated.
Consolidation of duplicate effort and turning
day-to-day Shuttle operations over to an
industrial operator could reduce Shuttle nonhardware operations costs by at least $1.58
per year.
The NASA is significantly improving the
Shuttle flight rate capability. The typical
turnaround time (TAT) for a 1992 Shuttle
flight (Figure 6) was 134 days (DRFC 7, OPF
83, VAB 7 and Pad 37). Several actions
being implemented have improved this
schedule. Landing at KSC saves 7 days. At

the OPF, use of standardized and streamlined
flows, expansion of fair wear-and-tear
specifications, increased use of in-flight
checkout, and use of manifesting techniques

....

.......

...

flllf•ll•'fll

6.

Turnaround

~·=·-

- · Ntllll · · - - -

-.~1"' ..a:;,;:ij:~1

Figure

ground processing. How quickly a LON
payload can be launched depends on where
the Shuttle Orbiter is in its turnaround cycle.
Figure 7 shows the various scenarios for
inserting a LON payload. As shown, the
shonest time to launch will be achieved if the
call-up occurs at the stan of the up-mission
processing (UMPS). Under that condition, the
payload can be launched in 75 days. The
worst scenarios are those that occur just as the
Orbiter lands, or when the Shuttle is at the
pad with a payload which must be removed to
accommodate the LON payload. Under those
scenarios, launch could not occur for 96 days.
Additional timeline improvements could be
achieved for payloads with a minimum of
software and hardware interfaces with the
Shuttle.

Time

:=::

Is

Being

Significantly Reduced
to minimize reconfiguration are helping reach

the goal of a 51-day typical processing time
by 1995. In the YAB and on the pad,
combining operations, improving test
effectiveness, and using dedicated teams, as
well as standard flows, are helping reduce the
typical time from 44 to 27 days. These actions
will enable a theoretical flight rate greater
than 16 per year with a four-Orbiter fleet.
Even after allowing for Orbiter down-time,
unequally spaced missions, weather, and other
contingencies, a realistic flight rate of 12 per

year is achievable, opening up at least 4
flights per year for DoD.
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Figure 7. LON Processing Flow Options
The
Shuttle
Launch-On-Nec.d
(LON)
capability was required by and planned for by
the DoD. Currently, the only planned LON is
a Hubble Telescope repair mission which can
be flown within 12 months of ca11-up. A
payload with less complex requirements could
be called up on a shoncr timeline. For a
payload to be classified as an LON payload,
1) its integration cycle must be complete; 2)
all operational documentation must be
developed and on the shelf; 3) the ground
flow must be validated by pathfinder or

analytically; and, 4) no configuration changes
are allowed that would invalidate the safety or
integration processes. If a payload can be
stored at the launch site, time will be saved in
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The decision to ban payloads requiring a
Centaur upper stage after the Challenger
accident was a response to the inherent
additional danger to the crew posed by high
energy liquid propellant upper stages. The
hardware system to accommodate a Centaur
stage exists and was, in fact, scheduled to be
installed for the next flight following the
Challenger accident. The only constraint to
flying a Centaur class payload is the presence
of the crew. Several studies have looked at

flying the Shuttle without the crew. Two
types of crew-less configurations could be
developed. One implements an Automated

Orbiter Kit (AOK) and the other provides a
Reusable Cargo Vehicle (RCV). The AOK
provides an automaied mission kit in the crew
module that performs normal crew functions
but does not substantially change the Orbiter
configuration. Payload lift capability is
increased by 10,000 to 12,500 pounds by the
removal of the crew and selected crew
equipment. The RCV concept removes all
crew unique systems thereby saving weight
and improving performance by over 20,000
pounds. The RCV cost and schedule is
essentially the same as a new Orbiter.
Typical of upper stages which can be used to
launch DoD payloads from the Shuttle
nominal parking orbit is the IRIS. IRIS was
developed by Alenia Spazio for the Italian
Space Agency to launch LAGEOS 2 into a
5900 Km orbit at a 52 degree inclination. The
IRIS system is designed to inject a 900 kg
mass payload into geostationary transfer orbit,
starting from the Shuttle nominal parking
orbit. Figure 8 gives the performance
characteristics of the IRIS launched from a
standard Shuttle orbit.

to fly on Shuttle as well as ELVs is related to
physically adapting the payload and designing
systems that are man-rated in terms of safety,
redundancy and reliability Some payloads are
dual compatible now. DSP has flown on
Shuttle and may be flown on it again. GPS
was originally designed to fly on Shuttle.
Some national asset payloads may be Shuttle
compatible. Payloads utilizing tuS or PAM
upper stages should require minimal change.
The impact on new development payloads
would be minimal since in-line design would
avoid the high cost of redesign and
recertification. A cradle can be developed
which will adapt Titan IV payloads to Shuttle
so that the payloads would be able to fly on
either system without design change. Similar
"launch vehicle simulators" might be worth
investigating for Atlas and Delta class
payloads.
Another perceived impediment to launching
DoD payloads on Shuttle is the reduction in
Shuttle security. The DoD terminated full
control mode for Shuttle missions with STS38 as a cost avoidance. Security constraints
on the integration process for the flights of
AFP-675, IBSS, and STP-1 on STS-39 and
the flight of DSP on STS-44 were waived by
the DoD. Detailed payload capabilities and
test results remained classified. No security
problems were encountered on those
missions. Prior to STS-53, which flew the
DoD-1 payload, security requirements were
relaxed under the DoD Secure Shuttle
Operations (OSSO) concept. That flight
demonstrated that economical and adequate
security measures are still in place to protect
national interests.
Summary

Figure 8. IRIS Payload Capability From
Standard Shuttle Orbit
The cost of designing payloads for dual
launch system capability has been perceived

as an issue. Since the induced environments
for Shuttle and Titan IV are essentially the
same, with Shuttle being slightly more
benign, the added cost of designing payloads

Revisiting the use of the Space Shuttle to
ensure access to space for national priority
payloads is wonhwhile. Capability, reliability,
affordability, and responsiveness are all
attributes of today's Space Shuttle system. The
definition of our nation's DoD priorities,
coupled with the "new NASA", supports the
need to re-ex;amine the military's use of
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Shuttle. Noc only is the currenc manifesc
supportive of increased DoD use, but NASA's
new cuhure better accommodates the mutual
resolution of technical and programmatic
issues. The current administrative policies that
restrict DoD use of Shuttle need to be
addressed and updated. The Shuttle is a
national asset. The question is not whether the
nation should have a Shuttle - it is here. The
real question is how can the DoD quickly and
cost effectively execute its space mission.
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